We study the equilibrium-price paths of a finite-horizon dynamic duopoly model in which the market price does not have to adjust instantaneously in response to changes in the quantity supplied. A complete analysis of the feedback Nash equilibrium of a finite-horizon linear quadratic differential game with a control constraint is presented. Two equilibrium price paths are identified and it is shown that they both remain close to the infinite-horizon globally asymptotically-stable stationary equilibrium except for some initial and final time.
INTRODUCTION
In a previous paper (Fershtman and Kamien 1987) we studied an infinite-horizon model of dynamic duopolistic competition under the assumption that current price does not necessarily adjust instantaneously to its level on a static demand function for that output. Instead, the evolution of price over time was assumed to be governed by a kinematic equation that specifies, for every given level of output, its change as a function of the gap between its current level and the price indicated by a static demand function. The main objective of that paper was to investigate the relationship between the speed at which the price converges to its value on the static demand function and the resultant stationary subgame-perfect Markov equilibrium price. Our main purpose here is to present a complete analysis of the feedback Nash equilibrium of a finite-horizon linear quadratic differential game with a control constraint. We are especially interested in the relationship between the "turnpike properties" of the finite-horizon equilibrium strategies and the infinite-horizon equilibrium strategies.
The infinite-horizon assumption simplifies the analysis of the linear quadratic differential game for then equilibrium feedback strategies are autonomous decision rules that specify the control (output rate in our case) only as a function of the observed state variables. See also Driskill and McCafferty (1987) and Reynolds (1987a, b) , and for a more detailed discussion on the autonomy of the solution in an infinite-horizon problem see Kamien and Schwartz (1981, p. 238) . With a finite horizon the feedback equilibrium strategies are nonautonomous and this complicates the analysis. In the infinite-horizon case we identified two stationary equilibrium prices, one of which was globally asymptotically stable, and therefore subgame perfect, while the other was not. For the finite-horizon game we also identify two equilibrium-price paths, and for a time horizon which is long enough * Manuscript received October 1987; revised June 1988.
' We wish to thank the referee for some very useful suggestions. both paths stay in the neighborhood of the globally asymptotically-stable stationary equilibrium price, except during some initial and final time.
Introducing price stickiness or quantity stickiness into the analysis of dynamic oligopoly introduces a time dependent structure into the model. The multiperiod oligopoly game ceases to be a game which identically repeats itself over time since the profit function at each period depends on the history of the game as well as on the players current choice of actions. Earlier works on dynamic duopoly with sticky prices include that of Roos (1925 Roos ( , 1927 , and Simaan and Takayama (1978) . For a model of quantity stickiness see Driskill and McCafferty (1987) . Dockner (1988) has extended our two firm model to the general n firm case.
Section 2 contains our model and summary of our results for the infinite-horizon case. In the following section we derive the feedback equilibrium strategies and demonstrate their symmetry. Section 4 contains our turnpike results. A brief summary completes the paper.
DYNAMIC DUOPOLY WITH STICKY PRICES
Under the sticky-prices assumption, price in the market does not adjust instantaneously to the price indicated by the static demand function. The evolution of the price over time is governed by the kinematic equation
(1) dp 
Thus, it is evident that the firms face a downward sloping linear inverse demand function, but the decline in price along it, as the output level increases, is retarded when s is finite.
Alternatively, one can think of a market in which consumers' utility functions depend on both current consumption and past consumption of a good, see for example Ryder and Heal (1973) . Integrating ( 1 ) with p(0) = a yields:
which implies that the current price is a function of the entire time path of consumption, where recent consumption of the good has a more depressing effect on its current desirability than earlier consumption.
Total production cost is assumed to be quadratic in output and identical for each firm
The objective of each firm is to maximize its discounted profits. subject to (1) and ui 2 0.
The problem now is formulated as a finite-horizon linear quadratic-differential game. There are two major strategy spaces that have been discussed in the differential games literature. One is the open-loop strategy space in which players choose path strategies; the other is the closed-loop or feedback strategy space in which players choose decision rule strategies. For a detailed discussion of strategy spaces in differential games see Basar and Olsder (1982) . In most cases, including the game we consider, the Nash equilibrium in open-loop strategies is not subgame perfect (see Fershtman 1987 for a discussion of classes of games for which the open-loop equilibrium is subgame perfect). Thus, we restrict our attention in this paper to the (subgame-perfect) feedback Nash equilibrium.
DEFINITION 1. The feedback strategy space for player i is Si = { u i ( t , p)jui(t, p) is continuous in ( t , p), ui(t, p) 2 0 and lui(t, p) -u i ( t , p')l 5 m(t)lp -p'j for some integrable m ( t ) 2 0).

DEFINITION 2. A feedback Nash equilibrium is a pair of feedback strategies
(uq, u;) E S 1 X SZ such that for every possible initial condition ( P O , 
to).
In Fershtman and Kamien (1987) we investigated the above dynamic duopoly problem assuming an infinite horizon and demonstrated the following.
(A) The following strategies constitute an asymptotically-stable feedback Nash equilibrium for the infinite-horizon game where (B) A second equilibrium is defined by the strategies (4') and by letting
The reason for the sign reversal between (4) and (4') is that in (4') the coefficient of p is negative.
(C) For each such equilibrium strategy there is a unique stationary equilibrium price, i.e., there is a price level jj such that if a game starts at p(0) = p the equilibrium-price path is p*(t) = p. This price level is given by
Notice that this stationary equilibrium price does depend on the initial conditions of the game. (D) Only the equilibrium specified in (A) satisfies the global asymptotic stability property. This property implies that regardless of the initial value of the state variables (price in our case) the equilibrium path converges to the stationary equilibrium. Thus, this path is the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, while the other defined by (4') is not. The subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium path was investigated for capital accumulation growth models (see, for example, Brock and Scheinkman 1976) and for capital accumulation games (see Fershtman and Muller 1986) .
(E) As the speed of adjustment goes to infinity, the static Cournot equilibrium price is the asymptotic limit of the open-loop Nash equilibrium, which is not subgame perfect, while the globally stable closed-loop Nash equilibrium price converges to a value below it.
From the above results it is evident that in the infinite-horizon case the equilibrium strategies are time autonomous. K , and E, are constants that depend on the parameters of the problem, U T (~) is a linear function of p that prescribes an output rate for every p independent of t , and the critical price i, is also time autonomous. In the finite-horizon case the equilibrium strategies are nonautonomous. The output rate depends on the date t as well as on price and the critical price i, is now a function of t .
THE FINITE-HORIZON FEEDBACK NASH EQUILIBRIUM
Our first task is to find the equilibrium strategies and the resultant equilibriumprice trajectory. PROOF. Using the value function approach (see Starr and H o 1969) the feedback-equilibrium strategies (uT(t, p ) , u;(t, p) ) must satisfy at every t the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations,
where v i ( t , p) is the value for firm i of the game that starts at time t at the price p, V; = avi/ap, and v: = a v i / a t .
Notice that the right side of (9) is concave with respect to ui. Assume for the moment that there is an interior solution to this maximization problem.* In this case the u; that maximizes this expression is given by
We ignore at this stage the constraint u, 2 0. We will elaborate on the implications of this constraint and on the modification that should be made in the solution later on.
with the boundary condition v~( T , p) = 0. Substituting (10) into (9) yields
The above presents a pair of partial differential equations. By solving this system and finding the value functions ( v l ( t , p) , v 2 ( t , p)) we can use (10) to find the equilibrium strategies. We consider the quadratic value function Differentiating (12) with respect to t and p yields Substituting (14) into (10) yields that
Substituting (13) and (14) into ( 1 1 ) yields
T o establish the symmetry of the solution we interrupt the Proof of Theorem 1 to establish the following:
LEMMA 1. The equilibrium output strategies uT(t, p) are symmetric, i.e., uT(t, P ) = u*2(t, PI, for e v e v ( t , PI.
PROOF. Since (16) must be satisfied for all values o f p , the coefficients o f p 2 , p and the constant terms have to be zero. This implies, after some algebraic manipulation, that From (17), we have, upon subtraction
Let v = K 1 + K2 and w = K 1 -K 2 , which implies that w = K1 -K2. Then (20) can be rewritten as
which is a first order differential equation whose solution is where C is the constant of integration. T o evaluate it we must make use of the boundary condition V$T, p) = 0 , i = 1 , 2, which, because it has to hold for every p, implies that K 1 ( T ) = K 2 ( T ) = 0. Thus, w ( T ) = K 1 ( T ) -K 2 ( T ) = 0 and the constant of integration C = 0. It follows, therefore, that w(t) = 0 and K l ( t ) = K2(t) V 0 5 t 5 T. The same type of argument can be applied to establish that E l ( t ) = (17), (18) and (19) as A general solution of (23) is given by (see Ford 1955) where A is the constant of integration. Since v;(T, p) = 0 for every p , this boundary condition implies that at time Given K ( t ) we can solve (24) to find E(t). The general solution of (24) is
E2(t), given that we already established that K l ( t ) = K2(t). Finally, it follows that g~( t ) = g2(t). Thus, uT(t, P ) = u l ( t , PI.
Returning to the Proof of Theorem 1 we let K l ( t ) = K2(t) = K(t), E,(t) = E2(t) = E(t), and gl (t) = g2(t) = g(t) and rewrite
Using the boundary condition E ( T ) = 0 , we can find C, the constant of integration Substituting (31) into (30) yields which can be rewritten as (7). From (10) and (14) it is evident that the condition of having an interior solution to the right side of (9) is that If the above condition does not hold it means that p is too low and firms should stop production, i.e., u i = 0 . Denote this critical price as @(t). Notice also that equation (15) satisfies the constraint u i r 0 only if p(t) r p(t). Clearly for p < j ( t ) the quadratic value function (12) is not appropriate since it will not satisfy the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman condition (9).
Now it only remains to define a value function for p(t) < j ( t ) that will satisfy (9).
Clearly when ui = 0 the instantaneous profit function is zero. However, the price as indicated by ( 1 ) goes up. The firms will start to produce when the price reaches the critical level @(t). Let ; (p, t ) be the time that it takes to reach the critical price from the price level p at time t . Now for every p(t) < p(t) let 
Qi(t, p ) = e -" ( p , ' ) v i ( p ( t + i(p, t ) ) , t + i(p, t ) )
be the value function. The intuition of this value function is straightforward. For every p(t) < @(t), instantaneous profits are zero. The firm has to wait for i(p, t ) until it will start to make some profit and the value of the game starting at p(t) is already discussed. Now it only remains to be proven that this value function satisfies the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman condition. Substituting u; = 0 , and i = 1 , 2 , into (9) yields the condition that the value function (34) must satisfy:
Using the kinematic equation ( 1 ) Notice that Theorem 1 does not define a unique pair of equilibrium strategies. Switching a , and a2 in equation (6) will give us different formulas for K(t). Since K(t) is not uniquely defined and E(t) is a function of K(t) it is clear that E(t) is also not uniquely defined.
TURNPIKE PROPERTIES OF THE FEEDBACK-EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES
In the capital-accumulation growth literature the asymptotic properties of optimal paths are usually referred to as "turnpike properties" (see Cass 1966) . We borrow the turnpike terminology and discuss the asymptotic properties of the equilibrium strategies. In particular we are interested in the following three properties: (i) the equilibrium of the infinite-horizon game converges to the unique stationary equilibrium regardless of the initial conditions; (ii) for a time horizon long enough the finite-horizon equilibrium stays in the neighborhood of the infinitehorizon equilibrium except for some final time; (iii) for a time horizon long enough the finite-horizon equilibrium stays in the neighborhood of the stationary equilibrium except for some initial and final time.
The first turnpike property is actually the asymptotic stability property that was discussed in Section 1. The second turnpike property is proven below. THEOREM 2. For every E > 0 a n d T I there is T2 such thatfor every T > T2 each of the two eq~~ilibrium strategies of theJinite-horizon game are in E neighborhood of the globally asymptotically-stable inJinite-horizon equilibrium strategies for every 0 < t < T I .
PROOF. We will prove the above turnpike property for each of the finite-horizon equilibria. The equilibrium strategies of the finite-horizon game are given by Note that we deviate here from our previous notation and write KT(t) and ET(t) to emphasize that these two functions depend on the horizon of the game. For the infinite-horizon game the equilibrium strategies are given by the same expression when K, and E, replace K T and ET. Thus the proof will be carried out by comparing K T and ET with K, and Em.
Let us begin with the case a1 < a2. By investigating (6) it is clear that for every ~1 > 0 and T I there is T2 > T 1 such that SUPr5~, IKT(t) -a l 1 < s l for every T > T2. This is true because for any given t < T I , KT(t) + a as T + w. Now observe that a1 is a stationary solution of (23) and from (4a) it is evident that K, = a Turning now to the case a l > a 2 , let Then (6) can be written as But then limT,, K(t) = a2 since limT,, x + w. Thus, in both cases, K, equals the smaller root.
The solution of ET(t) is given by (7). Using the above result, it is evident that for a given t < T , ET(t) + E, as T+ w. Thus for every E~ and T1 there is T2 > T I such that SUPr5~, IET(t) -Eml < E~ for every T > T 2 . Clearly, by choosing and ~2 to be sufficiently small, we can find T2 such that for every T > T2 and 0 I t I T I both equilibrium strategies for the finite-horizon game will be in the &-neighborhood of the globally asymptotically-stable infinite-horizon equilibrium strategies. Q.E.D.
From the above theorem it is evident that the equilibrium-price path satisfies the same turnpike property. PROOF. The proof is straightforward from Theorem 2. The equilibrium price at time t is determined by the quantity strategies that have been played until time t , and since these strategies satisfy the above turnpike property it follows immediately that the equilibrium-price paths satisfy the same property.
Q.E.D.
The exact finite-horizon price-equilibrium path can be found by substituting the equilibrium strategies (5) into the kinematic equation (1) and for t > 0) the equilibrium-price path is given by (43) when fi(;(Po, 0)) is regarded as the initial price, and 0) is regarded as the initial time.
CONCLUSION
We have analyzed a finite-horizon differential game model of duopolistic competition through time under the supposition that prices do not adjust immediately to their level on the demand function for each level of output. We have shown that duopolists' equilibrium strategies are symmetric and that there are two distinct equilibria for the finite-horizon game, each of which, for a sufficiently long time horizon, approaches the globally asymptotically-stable infinite-horizon equilibrium strategies arbitrarily close. They diverge from the infinite-horizon equilibrium strategies as the finite horizon nears and end gaming begins. Thus, the strategies in the finite-horizon model exhibit a turnpike property. 
